Moral Psychology with Nietzsche by Stern, Tom




Moral Psychology with Nietzsche, by Brian Leiter. Oxford: OUP, 2019. Pp. x + 198.1 
Moral Psychology with Nietzsche draws from the last two decades of Professor Leiter’s 
writing on Nietzsche, combining substantially revised articles and book chapters into one 
coherent volume. Those who know Leiter’s Nietzsche will recognise the main ideas, but he 
has organised the material to bring out his central theses, responding to criticisms and 
clarifying his position. Those who know his style will not be surprised to find some biffing 
and thwacking, but the emphasis in this book is always on argument. 
Leiter fights a war on two fronts. First, he gives an interpretation of Nietzsche’s moral 
psychology. On this front, interlocutors are other Nietzsche commentators; support comes 
from Nietzsche’s texts. Second, broadly speaking, he defends the (purportedly) Nietzschean 
view: Nietzsche is not right about everything in moral psychology, just ‘much of [it]’ (p. 10). 
On this front, interlocutors are moral philosophers, past and present; support comes from 
philosophical argumentation and empirical psychology. Leiter’s work distinguishes itself by 
fighting on both fronts, although they are independent. What, then, is the Nietzschean-and-
right view? 
There are several, connected strands, but they can be summarised as follows.  
1. Speculative, methodological naturalism (pp. 1-14). ‘Methodological’, meaning 
‘calling for continuity with the methods of successful sciences’ (pp. 2-3). 
‘Speculative’, because many claims of central relevance to moral psychology had not 
then been subjected to scientific evaluation: Nietzsche was making good guesses, 
based on materials he read and on acute observation (p. 83; pp. 5-9).  
 
2. Anti-realism about all values, including moral (pp. 17-66) and epistemic values (pp. 
84-111). 
 
3. Sentimentalism. Moral judgments are best explained by emotional responses, namely 
by ‘basic affects’ (p. 67) (inclinations and aversions), which are non-cognitive, and by 
affective responses to these basic affects, which may contain cognitive components 
(p. 67-83).  
 
4. Type-fact fatalism. ‘Heritable type-facts’ (p. 9) centrally determine our personality 
and our behaviour, insofar as it is morally relevant, including the inclinations and 
aversions mentioned above. ‘Type-facts’ are physiological and/or psychological facts 
about a person, which might be innate or acquired (p. 3, fn5). Leiter defines 
‘heritable’ in terms of ‘genes’ and ‘genetic material’ (p. 168), which looks 
anachronistic when applied to Nietzsche. But the aim, with these ‘facts’, is to mark 
out a space for explanations of our values and behaviours which appeal neither to 
what our parents taught us nor to our rational capacities (pp. 162-180).     
 
                                                          
1 Author’s note: This is the unpublished draft of a review, which is forthcoming in 
MIND. The first version was submitted on the 22nd October, 2019 and then sent to 
Professor Leiter, by MIND, for comments.  
 




5. Scepticism about the causal efficacy of conscious deliberation in motivating action. 
Purported moral reasons or justifications are ‘post-hoc rationalisations of feelings that 
have an antecedent source’ (p. 9, pp. 115-146). 
 
6. ‘No one has free will or is morally responsible’ (p. 117; pp. 115-161). 
This result is a wide-ranging, contentious, but (Leiter argues) empirically supported naturalist 
moral psychology. In sum: this is Nietzsche; and Nietzsche wins. 
This review says more about ‘this is Nietzsche’ than about ‘Nietzsche wins’ because, 
although the latter may be more significant, I have more to offer regarding the former. 
Leiter’s Nietzsche certainly seems right that we vastly overestimate the role of conscious, 
rational deliberation when it comes to action. Elsewhere, I am more sceptical, but I leave the 
finer details to others. Leiter’s anti-realism about epistemic values looks subject to a self-
refutation problem: how to defend such a claim without invoking the kinds of values – 
epistemic norms – the existence of which it denies. He answers that we shouldn’t defend it by 
appealing to epistemic norms; we should defend it because the naturalism underpinning it 
‘works’. I myself can’t see a way to cash out what counts as ‘working’ that won’t rest, 
eventually, either on a dogmatic assertion or an epistemic norm, but Leiter’s defences against 
self-refutation and other charges are easily found (pp. 99-111).  
Is this Nietzsche? This is a complex question but, in key respects, my answer is no. Leiter’s 
methods are the best place to start. Four features of his approach deserve attention. First, 
Leiter spends little time with the books that Nietzsche himself read, whether philosophical, 
scientific or historical. Nietzsche did not read English, and much of what he read remains 
untranslated, but Leiter quotes and cites next to nothing in German or French (which 
Nietzsche did eventually read). Much of the contemporary, high-quality philological 
literature is in German. Virtually none of this finds a place here, either. There are good, 
English-language summaries and analyses. Leiter refers to some of these, but he rarely 
discusses, in any detail, either the sources themselves or Nietzsche’s relation to them. 
Moreover, there are some contentious, unsupported assertions, for example about Nietzsche’s 
‘lively interest in contemporary psychological research’ (p. 83; cf. Sommer 2019, 45). 
Second, Leiter treats ‘mature’ Nietzsche (pp. 30, 70) as everything from Daybreak onwards 
(1881-88). Third, at crucial points, Leiter sets out some predetermined philosophical 
positions (naturalism, anti-realism) and then isolates quotations in the texts which seem or 
seem not to categorise Nietzsche accordingly. Finally, Leiter is a liberal user of the principle 
of charity.  
None of these four decisions guarantees, a priori, that the resulting interpretation is faulty. 
But, here, they add up to make it easier for Leiter to interpret Nietzsche as having 
philosophical views Leiter considers, independently, to be right, and easier to ignore a 
reading which has considerably more exegetical plausibility. The first decision sidesteps 
difficult questions about Nietzsche’s sources and how he used them. I am about to ask some. 
The second enables Leiter to draw from a wide range of texts without asking whether things 
might have changed between them. I am about to describe some changes. The third pushes 
the reader towards a pre-given set of options without giving her pause for thought about 
whether the whole issue might simply be orthogonal to Nietzsche’s aims. I am about to 
suggest that, in some cases, it is. The fourth enables Leiter to push through his 




philosophically favoured option and then to complain that Nietzsche has not received the 
credit he deserves. In Nietzsche’s late works, I am about to suggest, things are not so rosy. 
Nietzsche’s alleged speculative, methodological naturalism kicks off Leiter’s reconstruction. 
It also brings together some of the methodological features noted above. We can usefully 
begin by saying a little more about Nietzsche’s working methods than Leiter does, before 
turning back to the question of naturalism.  
Leiter notes Nietzsche’s ‘extensive readings in the biological sciences’ (p. 68; similarly, p. 
11), but this is hardly the whole truth. Nietzsche certainly used scientific and historical 
sources, but he preferred writers who agreed with his general attitudes and whose writings he 
could understand given his limited natural-scientific education. He read, in the words of one 
historicist scholar, based on what was ‘more fruitful for his thoughts’ (Holub 2018, 341), 
rather than looking for the best contemporary science available. J. G. Vogt’s physics was 
consulted, despite resting on what are fairly called ‘highly arbitrary a priori assumptions’ 
(Small 2001, xiii, 137). Why? Summarising roughly, Vogt’s book had user-friendly 
illustrations but no mathematics; it offered some material for a cosmological eternal 
recurrence doctrine, while stimulating Nietzsche’s ideas about power (Small 2001, 137–39; 
Sommer 2019, 44). He read obscure figures like William Rolph, who argued that 
egalitarianism was contrary to the fundamental biological workings of living things. He read 
Wilhelm Roux, who thought, contra Darwin, that there was a Darwinian struggle within 
organisms, enabling them to survive. The physician Charles Féré, a major influence, claimed 
that criminals were physiological degenerates against whom society had every right to defend 
itself, for example by preventing them from reproducing; unfortunately, sickly, anti-natural 
modern morals stood in the way (e.g. Féré 1888, 104). Nietzsche drew from (but also 
misrepresented the claims of) serious historians like Julius Wellhausen, who, Nietzsche 
thought, provided empirical evidence that Judeo-Christian morality resulted from an anti-
natural confidence trick performed by a self-interested priesthood (Stern 2019a). But 
Nietzsche also used sources considered hopelessly unscientific by the standards of his own 
time (Sommer 2012, 367). Louis Jacolliot, for example, claimed to have access to curiously 
unidentifiable ancient documents linking the origins of the Jews to an inferior Eastern caste 
which, on Nietzsche’s own summary, was a kind of ‘excrement’ emitted from the noble 
classes (Nietzsche 1988, vol. 13, p. 378; henceforth ‘KSA’ followed by volume and page 
number). Nietzsche drew repeatedly on Jacolliot (see Sommer 2013, 265–70, 2012, 365–71), 
with a view to saying that Judeo-Christian morality was anti-natural in comparison with an 
Eastern model which legislated differently according to the different natural-physiological 
types of its subjects. Note that Nietzsche distorted Jacolliot in summarising him (Sommer 
2013, 274–75). Here, Nietzsche was not merely, at best, an outstandingly credulous reader: 
he misrepresented what he read.  
Was Nietzsche, then, a speculative, methodological naturalist? Nietzsche certainly 
speculated, though his distortions of Jacolliot do not, prima facie, imply that we are dealing 
with the inspired predictions of someone working with the best available materials (cf. pp. 9-
11). I am reluctant to call him a methodological naturalist, because philosophising in a 
manner that is ‘continuous with the methods of the successful sciences’ (p. 2) sounds 
incompatible with cherry picking and fabricating, which Nietzsche obviously did when it 
suited him. If Leiter thinks, conversely, that these things are compatible, he ought to 
emphasise that counterintuitive claim.  




Does Leiter think that? It is hard to tell. Leiter does not really discuss Nietzsche’s use of his 
sources and certainly none of the well-documented cases described above. In his brief 
account of the continuity he has in mind (pp. 2-3), Leiter builds on Stroud’s Hume, who was 
seeking to explain ‘everything in human affairs’ in terms of ‘relatively few extremely general, 
perhaps universal, principles’ (p. 3). Leiter also rules out ‘supernatural entities which play no 
explanatory role in the successful sciences’ (p. 2). If that, or something like it, is really all, it 
might permit Nietzsche’s actual methods: speculative, methodological naturalists can cherry-
pick and fabricate their way to a small number of principles explaining human nature, as long 
as they don’t mention God. This forgivingly expansive definition would likely invite some 
undesirable ‘naturalists’ to the party. Pseudoscientists, for example, are not obviously 
excluded, if their principles are few and godless, and their explanatory ambitions wide-
ranging. Later on, though, Leiter gives an account of ‘best explanation’ deriving from 
‘successful empirical sciences’ (p. 23). The desiderata include ‘explaining phenomena in a 
way consistent with […] other beliefs about the world that have been well confirmed’ (p. 23). 
Would this not rule out cherry-picking and distorting? Generally, which intuitive restrictions 
on the kinds of principles available to methodological naturalists won’t end up excluding the 
methods we know Nietzsche employed?  
A different response might be adapted from a reply Leiter gives to some of Janaway’s 
criticisms. Leiter allows that Nietzsche’s naturalism can sometimes be ‘enlisted’, 
‘subordinated’ or ‘displaced’ (p. 6) as part of a strategy of persuasion. These metaphors are 
ambiguous. They might mean that naturalism is put to use yet still completely respected, as 
material science might be ‘enlisted’ (though hardly ‘displaced’) to build a bridge. If so, we 
have come no further than the dilemma just elaborated. But perhaps Leiter means that 
Nietzsche is trying to push his subjective values and that these values sometimes justify not 
philosophising naturalistically. Now, though, the claim that Nietzsche is a speculative, 
methodological naturalist would look difficult to falsify on the basis of Nietzsche’s own texts 
and methods, since it would be consistent with his suspension of that stance on any given 
occasion.  
I have suggested the following. Either, Nietzsche was not a speculative methodological 
naturalist. Or, if he was: either, first, the concept’s application is counter-intuitively broad, 
likely even by Leiter’s standards, and Leiter does not indicate how it could be narrowed 
without excluding Nietzsche; or, second, Leiter’s claim is hard to falsify. None of this, 
however, is my main point. It is that we need not choose: Nietzsche never claims to be a 
speculative methodological naturalist; all the urgency comes from Leiter. The burden rests on 
Leiter to justify asking the question and then, of course, to answer without begging it.  
Much of Leiter’s analysis remains standing once the naturalism is removed. Some elements 
are uncontroversial – points 5. and 6., above, for example. Elsewhere, it matters when 
Nietzsche was writing. In his middle period (here, I mean roughly: 1881-86), Nietzsche looks 
closer to Leiter’s picture than he does after that in two key respects. First, Middle Nietzsche 
talks of physiological and psychological grounds for moral views, but he offers no discernible 
unifying physiological theory: this is amenable to Leiter’s Nietzsche, who likewise keeps the 
physiology vague and promissory. Second, Middle Nietzsche gives little suggestion that 
anything is naturally valuable. Indeed, in one place, Middle Nietzsche claims that there are no 
values in nature, which is conducive to Leiter’s moral anti-realist reading (KSA 3, 539-40; 
Leiter, pp. 20-21). Not everything in Middle Nietzsche fits Leiter’s Nietzsche. In one place, 




Nietzsche has moral inclinations and aversions passed from parents to children via 
observation (KSA 3, 43). This Nietzsche would probably not be a ‘Nietzschean’, following 
Leiter’s typology, but rather an ‘Aristotelian’ (cf. Leiter, pp. 171-4). The very next aphorism 
says something more ‘Nietzschean’, though. Middle Nietzsche provides the best support for 
Leiter. But things soon changed. Nietzsche’s physiological theory took more definite shape 
and his views on natural value changed, too. There is more nuance, vacillation and fuzziness 
than this suggests (see Stern 2020), but, here, we can boil Late Nietzsche’s moral view down 
to these four claims: 
1. ‘Life’, or ‘Will’, or ‘Will to Power’, sometimes ‘Nature’, is a force which operates 
through all living things, promoting something like growth, expansion, power-
seeking, accumulation, exploitation or resource-increase. (I use ‘Life’, capitalised, 
to indicate this force.)  
 
2. Any animal, humans included, may be understood physiologically in relation to 
Life, typically – this is what matters most – in binary terms: increasing or 
decreasing in power; ascending or declining; healthy or decadent. 
 
3. Moral values expressed by humans may be traced back to this physiological 
increase or decrease. 
 
4. We ought to side with Life.   
This picture retains Middle Nietzsche’s idea that physiology explains values. But Late 
Nietzsche is more specific. He categorizes values, and the physiological facts that underlie 
them, along binary lines: those which help Life and those which obstruct it. Next, he endorses 
the former, and opposes the latter. Here, he was indeed drawing on contemporary (at least 
purportedly) scientific and scholarly literature: Féré, Rolph, Roux, Jacolliot and Wellhausen 
are some of the authors who played a part, as can be gleaned even from the summaries given 
above. Nietzsche read many of them only well after 1881, hence after Leiter’s Nietzsche 
reaches maturity. Rolph and Roux supplied material relevant to Nietzsche’s biological 
account of life as a domain of power seeking and appropriating. Nietzsche’s notions of 
decline, decadence and degeneration borrow from Féré and his milieu (Holub 2018, 408–53). 
Usually, Nietzsche uses these latter terms to refer to those who fall on the wrong side of his 
binary division between those who are physiologically flourishing and those in whom Life is 
not doing its thing. The decadent person is not a louche afternoon drinker; he is the 
physiological equivalent of a batch of cookies that didn’t turn out well.  
This reading takes ‘will to power’ seriously, whereas Leiter argues that its significance has 
been overplayed. He denies that, for Nietzsche, ‘power is itself an objective, natural property’ 
(p. 51), without reference to Rolph, Roux and co. When arguing for Nietzsche’s naturalism, 
then, Leiter advertises the fact (though relatively little detail) of Nietzsche’s reading in 
natural science; when denying that power is a natural property for Nietzsche, Leiter does not 
directly discuss or acknowledge Nietzsche’s well-documented scientific influences. 
Unfortunately, the above account of will to power is not the interpretation that Leiter spends 
most of his time disputing (pp. 50-62). He prefers to target a different reading – something of 
a red herring, in my view – and consequently many of his criticisms miss the point. The red 




herring is that power is a human, psychological goal (p. 58), rather than a defining 
physiological feature of all living things. Moreover, because Nietzsche sometimes speaks of 
‘Life’ or ‘nature’, rather than ‘will to power’, it is unconvincing when Leiter claims that, 
because Nietzsche doesn’t often use the words ‘will to power’ in his autobiography or his 
1886 Prefaces, the idea plays no major role (p. 57). Nietzsche has plenty to say about this 
idea in these texts (KSA 1: 17-19; 3: 349; 6: 307, 313). In one, he looks to the future, hoping 
that he will have assassinated ‘two millennia of antinature’ and that a ‘party of Life’ (Team 
Life, if you will) will have attempted ‘the relentless destruction’ of Team Anti-Life, ‘of 
everything degenerating and parasitical’ (KSA 6, 313). Not the words ‘will to power’, but do 
not be mistaken: this is vintage, gold-plated will-to-power talk.  
Interestingly, Leiter seems inclined to agree with elements of this assessment. He refers to 
Hussain’s ‘clever’ article (p. 59, fn.19) summarising Nietzsche’s view along lines close to 
those given here (Hussain 2011; Hussain’s reading departs a little from my own, but, for 
present purposes, we can treat them as more or less identical). Leiter agrees that Hussain’s 
reading is superior to the reading he criticises. He swiftly dismisses it, however, on 
philosophical not textual grounds: in my terms, it does not provide a route from facts about 
Life (1.-3.) to the claim that we ought to help Life out (4.). But this is Nietzsche’s problem, 
not his interpreter’s. Here, as often, charitable reading seems to obstruct our understanding of 
Nietzsche (see Stern 2016). It would have been helpful to see a more careful, exegetical 
analysis of a view Leiter clearly takes seriously as an interpretation – even if, philosophically, 
it is not a goer.   
This issue is pressing for a striking reason. Many of the (late) quotations which Leiter himself 
chooses to support his reading look, on closer inspection of the passages from which those 
quotations are taken, to support the alternative reading just given. I limit myself to five 
examples, for reasons of space. 
Leiter writes: Nietzsche ‘holds that “[i]t is not error as error that” he objects to 
fundamentally’ in Christian morality (p. 12). So, to what does Nietzsche object 
fundamentally in Christian morality, in the passage from which Leiter quotes? Leiter does not 
say, but Nietzsche does: ‘It is the lack of nature, it is the utterly horrible fact that anti-nature 
itself received the highest honours as morality’ (KSA 6, 372). The fundamental objection is 
that Christianity is anti-natural, i.e. anti-Life: ‘one taught men to despise the very first 
instincts of life’ in favour of a ‘morality of decline’.  
Leiter repeatedly refers to a note he renders as follows: ‘“Moral judgments [are] symptoms 
and sign languages which betray the process of physiological prosperity or failure” (WP: 
258)’ (pp. 4, 68). Already, we see a physiological binary – prosperity (‘Gedeihens’) and 
failure (‘Missrathens’). Gedeihen is a term one might use for the healthy ‘flourishing’ of a 
plant or child. Missrathen suggests ‘turning out badly’ – like those cookies. Nietzsche, in this 
very note, gets sharper: ‘Applied to the specifically Christian-European morality: our moral 
judgments are signs of decay [Verfall], of not believing in Life [...]’ (KSA 12, 149).  
Leiter writes: ‘A “morality of sympathy”, [Nietzsche] claims, is “just another expression of… 
physiological overexcitability” (TI IX: 37)’ (p. 4). But what does Nietzsche say (in that very 
passage) about that physiological overexcitability? It is ‘characteristic of everything 
decadent’ (KSA 6, 137). ‘Our softening of morals […] is a consequence of decline 




[Niedergangs]’. We display the signs of a ‘general loss of vitality’, whereas stronger ages 
displayed the consequences of ‘a surplus of Life’.  
While claiming that Nietzsche works from morality back to affects, Leiter renders another 
passage as follows: ‘answers to the question about the value of existence may always be 
considered first of all as the symptoms of certain bodies’ (pp. 4, 68). Prima facie, this is not 
about morality but about ‘the question about the value of existence’ – i.e. the central concern 
of the so-called ‘pessimism dispute’, a raging contemporary controversy which Leiter doesn’t 
discuss and which I haven’t mentioned here, but which casts further light on Nietzsche’s Life 
theory (Stern 2019b). What kinds of bodies, though? In the passage Leiter is quoting from, 
answers to this question are, again, indexed to a binary distinction between ‘success and 
failure [Missrathens]’ (KSA 3, 349). Nietzsche is not tracing morality to affects; he is 
positing a link between one’s view about whether life is worth living, yes or no, and whether 
one’s living body turned out well or was a bad batch. 
Finally, allegedly in support of Nietzsche’s anti-realism, Leiter writes:  
 
‘[Nietzsche] describes the “revaluation of Christian values” as an “attempt, undertaken with 
every means” to bring “the counter-values [die Gegen-Werte]…to victory” (A 61) – not the 
“true” values or the “objectively correct” ones, but simply the opposite ones […] that appeal 
to a very different taste.’ (p. 46)  
Leiter is saying that Nietzsche’s choice of the term ‘counter-values’ indicates a reluctance to 
ascribe them any objective status: appropriately enough for an anti-realist, values are merely a 
matter of ‘taste’. But taste, in that very passage, is not the issue. The revaluation Nietzsche 
describes is the Renaissance, which he often sees as anti-Christian (pro-Life). During the 
Renaissance, to Luther’s horror, ‘Christianity sat no more on the papal seat! But rather, Life! 
Rather, the triumph of Life!’ (KSA 6, 251) The direction of argument is that Luther’s anti-Life, 
anti-natural Reformation opposes the Life-endorsing Renaissance. Christianity is against Life; 
Nietzsche, who is for Life, therefore favours the counter-values.   
By comparing these passages with the way Leiter quotes from them, we see something of the 
effort it requires – I do not mean deliberate falsification, of course – to use late Nietzsche’s 
words on physiology and value without revealing what Nietzsche is saying with those very 
words. Even in many (late) passages Leiter selects to support his reading, a different reading 
is seeping through the cracks. It is unattractive, philosophically. Yet there it is. Late 
Nietzsche does absolutely seem to think that power, suitably understood, is an objective, 
natural property (cf. p. 51).  
But was Late Nietzsche a moral anti-realist? For, as Leiter notes, power might be an 
objective, natural property, but not objectively valuable (p. 51). Leiter gives two Nietzsche-
independent arguments for anti-realism: a best-explanation argument for what is most basic 
(probably not objective moral values) and a best-explanation argument treating moral 
disagreement (the best explanation for which would probably not be one that included 
objective moral values). Are these ‘Nietzsche’s […] arguments for value anti-realism’ (p. 51, 
my emphasis; also pp. 61, 68)? I have already said something about ‘best explanation’ and its 
relation to Nietzsche. In sum, Leiter offers no good grounds for attributing the first argument 
to Nietzsche. He finds one unpublished note which resembles the second argument, but little 
from the late, published works. One alleged exception is BGE 186, which is, at best, vague – 




Leiter claims it ‘gestures’ in that direction (p. 29), but I found no such gesture. Conversely, 
Late Nietzsche sometimes resembles nothing so much as a naïve, natural realist who thought 
something was good if it did what nature intends (accumulation, power-seeking). He is happy 
to speak of ‘natural values’, of the ‘right, that is to say, natural relation to all things’ (KSA 6, 
193, Nietzsche’s emphasis), of ‘every demand supplied by the instinct of Life, in sum, 
everything which has value in itself’ (KSA 6, 196, Nietzsche’s emphasis). Why is it right to 
be natural? Here, Nietzsche simply has less of an answer. He effectively labels this problem 
‘inaccessible’ (KSA 6, 86, also 68), because Life (and the humans it inescapably operates 
through) can’t form a reliable judgment about itself. It doesn’t follow from a problem’s 
inaccessibility, or from Nietzsche’s lack of a comprehensive answer, that Nietzsche thinks the 
problem is accessible and that the answer has to do with anti-realism. Leiter does not analyse 
such passages, but they would surely be the place to begin. Meanwhile, it is odd to present 
Nietzsche as having much to contribute to contemporary debates about moral anti-realism.   
Leiter sometimes presents himself as someone who is not afraid of offering up Nietzsche’s 
perhaps disturbing, yet nonetheless perfectly correct, philosophical views. But, to my mind, 
Leiter is not, himself, entirely innocent of shying away – in his case, from offering up 
disturbing but less defensible aspects of Nietzsche’s thought. In the final chapter (co-authored 
with Joshua Knobe), Leiter cites Nietzsche as assuming the view, subsequently empirically 
supported (they claim), that  
‘morally-relevant traits […] are the product of not only environmental factors but also of 
heredity […] “It is simply not possible that a human being should not have the qualities and 
preferences of his parents and ancestors in his body,” as Nietzsche quips, “whatever 
appearances may suggest to the contrary” (BGE: 264).’ (p. 169)  
It is unclear why Leiter considers this a ‘quip’, especially in the light of Nietzsche’s very next 
sentence, which Leiter omits: ‘This is the problem of race.’ ‘Race’ had a different, vaguer set 
of connotations in Nietzsche’s context, but he has, with careful qualifications, been 
appropriately called a ‘philosopher of racialized breeding’ (Bernasconi 2017).  
Elsewhere, Leiter claims that opponents who have downplayed Nietzsche’s views on freedom 
or responsibility ‘aim to make Nietzsche less appalling to us delicate modern readers than he 
really is’ (p. 161).  
He continues:  
‘The resistance to these points in the recent scholarly literature […] reflects the continuing 
malign influence of moralizing readings of Nietzsche, of the failure to remember what he 
says about his conception of Renaissance virtue, namely, that we understand it, and him, 
“moraline-free” (A 2).’ 
If you look at what Nietzsche says next in that passage (A 2), you discover the following 
consequence of remaining “moraline-free” (free from Christian-moral bias): “The weak and 
the failures [Missrathnen] should perish: first principle of our love of humanity. And they 
should be helped to do this. What is more harmful than any vice? - Active pity for all failures 
and weakness - Christianity . . .”  
 
It is unsurprising, given Nietzsche’s context and outlook, that he was drawn to the thought 
that a solution to physiological decline might lie in what he calls helping the failures (the bad 




batches) to perish – in what was already beginning to be called ‘eugenics’. Use people’s 
values to detect the Missrathnen and then, well, follow the first principle. Leiter, it seems, is 
quoting Nietzsche in support of his claim that other Nietzsche scholars shy away from the 
appalling bits, while simultaneously declining to reproduce, even from that very passage, 
Nietzsche’s repeated suggestion that the physiologically decrepit ought to be shuffled off for 
the greater good. If so, I consider this ironic. But the more important point is that the 
criticisms set out here emerge from my attempt to understand what Nietzsche was saying, 
regardless of its soundness. That seems a good way of getting someone right – even if he was 
wrong. If merely setting out Nietzsche’s own ideas is sufficient to see them wither, then I 
hope Nietzsche would have appreciated at least this: it is a case of helping something perish, 
but out of love.   
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